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COPYRIGHT SUBJECT MATTER
AND A “LIGHT” FOR DESIGNERS’ RIGHTS
Matteo Mancinella†
Abstract
Copyright protection in the fashion industry is currently the
focus of intense debate in the United States, particularly centered on
the utility of special legislation to protect designs from knock-offs.
This article focuses on the importance of copyright protection for
fashion designers, and the obstacles to copyright currently faced by
fashion designers.
What is the legal rationale for not providing copyright
protection for fashion design? Why are designers’ creations not
granted copyright protection? Unlike authors and musicians, fashion
designers can only enjoy protection afforded by trademark for logos.
Clothing is considered a “useful article”—not eligible for copyright
protection—unless it is possible to separate its aesthetic elements
from its function. The fact that form and function are usually so linked
to each other makes copyright protection irrelevant, and thus design
is easily at the mercy of counterfeiting. Herein lies the desire to
legislate; but this issue divides the specialists, with some going so far
as to argue that knock-offs are positive and stimulating for the
fashion industry. This article will expound on this debate as it relates
to the Fashion Design Bill, including an analysis of the European
Design Law.
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INTRODUCTION

As of 2012, American intellectual property law provides
insufficient protection for fashion design.1 A fashion designer can
register a trademark for his or her label and obtain all the advantages
that this registration provides,2 in addition to the trademark rights that
come with the mark’s use in commerce.3 Intellectual property rights
can also provide a protection for fashion designers through design
patent, but the application process is costly and requires a lot of time.4
Fashion designs change with every season, and thus designers cannot
wait more than a few months to obtain protection for the next
season’s designs. But is there any protection for a garment under
copyright law? Has Congress ever considered the possibility of
offering protection for designs of useful articles?
In 1998 Congress, conscious of the boat manufacturers’ concerns
regarding illegal copying of boat hull designs,5 enacted the Vessel

1. See H.R. 5055, 109th Cong (2006) (proposing amendments to Title 17 of the United
State Code (codifying Copyright Act of 1976) in order to recognize copyright protection for
fashion design). Over the years, the bill has been revisited several times but it has not been
enacted yet. See Innovative Design Protection and Piracy Prevention Act, H.R. 2511, 112th
Cong. (2011) [hereinafter IDPPPA], available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS112hr2511ih/pdf/BILLS-112hr2511ih.pdf (currently in hearings); Design Piracy Prohibition
Act, H.R. 2196, 111th Cong. (2009) (stalled in committee hearings); Design Piracy Prohibition
Act, H.R. 2033, 110th Cong. (2007) (did not survive subcommittee hearings).
2. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b) (2011) (“A certificate of registration of a mark upon
the principal register provided by this chapter shall be prima facie evidence of the validity of the
registered mark and of the registration of the mark, of the owner’s ownership of the mark, and of
the owner’s exclusive right to use the registered mark in commerce on or in connection with the
goods or services specified in the certificate, subject to any conditions or limitations stated in the
certificate.”); id. § 1065 (“[T]he right of the owner to use such registered mark in commerce for
the goods or services on or in connection with which such registered mark has been in
continuous use for five consecutive years subsequent to the date of such registration and is still
in use in commerce, shall be incontestable . . . .”); id. § 1072 (“Registration of a mark on the
principal register provided by this chapter or under the Act of March 3, 1881, or the Act of
February 20, 1905, shall be constructive notice of the registrant’s claim of ownership thereof.”);
id. § 1111 (“[A] registrant of a mark registered in the Patent and Trademark Office, may give
notice that his mark is registered by displaying with the mark the words ‘Registered in U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office’ or ‘Reg. U.S. Pat. & Tm. Off.’ or the letter R enclosed within a
circle, thus ®; and in any suit for infringement under this chapter by such a registrant failing to
give such notice of registration, no profits and no damages shall be recovered under the
provisions of this chapter unless the defendant had actual notice of the registration.”).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (“The term ‘use in commerce’ means the bona fide use of a mark in
the ordinary course of trade, and not made merely to reserve a right in a mark.”).
4. Loni Schutte, Comment, Copyright for Couture, 2011 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. no. 11,
2011, at ¶1, available at http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1225&cont
ext=dltr.
5. See generally Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989)
(providing the “starting signal” for the lawmaker to enact the Vessel Hull Design Protection
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Hull Design Protection Act (VHDPA).6 The provisions of this Act do
not provide copyright protection but instead represent a sui generis
protection only to original vessel hull designs. Specifically, the
provisions guarantee ten years of protection7 for only the aspects of a
boat design that make it original and ornamental,8 and give the
registrant the exclusive right to “make, have made, or import, for sale
or for use in trade, any useful article embodying that design . . .
and . . . sell or distribute for sale or for use in trade any useful article
embodying that design.”9 Similar to design patents, protection is not
afforded to design features that are functional or utilitarian.10
After years of discussion, and increased litigation due to the
copying of clothing by “fast fashion” houses, Congress discussed the
possibility of extending protection under Chapter 13 of the Copyright
Act of 1976 to fashion design.11 Although Chapter 13 offers
protection only for designs of vessel hulls, the Fashion Design Bill,12
if enacted, would extend that protection to fashion designs as well,
with some exceptions: for example, while the term of protection for
vessel hull design is ten years,13 the term for fashion design will be
only three years.14 Given brevity of fashion design cycles, this shorter
term is considered sufficient to guarantee a designer exclusivity in his
or her designs.
So why not provide copyright protection for fashion designs?
This article argues in favor of such protection. This article will first
discuss the doctrines of copyright law that render fashion design
unprotectable, and then argue how fashion design can nevertheless
Act); see also Kevin Wimberly, Vessel Hull Design Protection Act—What the Hull?, FLORIDA
IP TRENDS (Feb. 23, 2009), http://www.floridaiptrends.com/2009/02/23/vessel-hull-designprotection-act-what-the-hull/.
6. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1332 (2011) (added as part of the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105–304, 112 Stat. 2905 (1998)).
7. Id. § 1305(a) (“[T]he protection provided under this chapter for a design shall
continue for a term of 10 years beginning on the date of the commencement of
protection . . . .”).
8. Id. § 1301(a)(1) (“The designer or other owner of an original design of a useful
article which makes the article attractive or distinctive in appearance to the purchasing or using
public may secure the protection provided by this chapter upon complying with and subject to
this chapter.”) (emphasis added).
9. Id. § 1308(1)-(2).
10. Power Controls Corp. v. Hybrinetics, Inc., 806 F.2d 234, 238 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
11. See Schutte, supra note 4, ¶¶ 20-23.
12. See Innovative Design Protection Act of 2012, S. 3523, 112th Cong. (2012)
(extending protection to fashion design); see also IDPPPA, supra note 1.
13. 17 U.S.C. § 1305(a).
14. IDPPPA, supra note 1, § 2(a).
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receive protection. This article will then discuss the European
approach to protection for fashion design, and finally discuss the
Fashion Design Bill that is currently moving through Congress.
II. NON-PROTECTABLE CATEGORIES OF WORKS OF AUTHORSHIP
UNDER COPYRIGHT LAW
A. The Genesis of the Idea/Expression Dichotomy and Judge
Hand’s Abstraction Test
Ideas related to fashion design usually involve two important
concepts, both separate but related at the same time: the designer’s
identity and the embodiment of the designer’s ideas.15 At the heart of
a fashion designer’s identity is his or her creative mind, and from the
creative mind springs inspiration, sensitivity, and fantasy that mix and
give shape to new and unique ideas. These creative ideas are
expressed through the realization of a real and tangible object: the
garment.
American copyright law, however, does not protect ideas; it
protects only the original way in which ideas are expressed by the
author.16 Scholars have criticized the dichotomy between idea and
expression ever since courts first made this distinction,17 yet courts
continue to embrace and even extend the doctrine.18 Can an idea exist
separate from an expression? This article will argue that they go hand
in hand.
During the 19th century, courts considered idea and expression
to be one and the same, and not separate concepts.19 However, in the
later part of that century, the Supreme Court in Burrow-Giles
Lithographics Co. v. Sarony articulated the principle that any concrete

15. David Adler, Fashion Design & The Law: A Rulebook for Independent Designers &
the
Marketers
Behind
Them,
FASHION’S
COLLECTIVE
(July
30,
2012),
http://fashionscollective.com/FashionAndLuxury/07/fashion-design-the-law-a-rulebook-forindependent-designers-the-marketers-behind-them/.
16. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2011) (“In no case does copyright protection for an original work
of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept,
principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or
embodied in such work.”).
17. See HUGH LADDIE, PETER PRESCOTT & MARY VITORIA, THE MODERN LAW OF
COPYRIGHT ¶ 2.55, at 33 (1980); see also Edward Samuels, The Idea-Expression Dichotomy in
Copyright Law, 56 TENN. L. REV. 321, 323-24 (1989), available at
http://www.edwardsamuels.com/copyright/beyond/articles/ideapt1-20.htm.
18. Samuels, supra note 17, at 323-24.
19. See generally Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No.
4,436).
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and tangible incorporation of an idea (i.e., any expression and its
manifestation) is protectable.20 The earlier case of Baker v. Selden21 is
considered to have first articulated the dichotomy expressed in
Burrow-Giles, but it did not explicitly distinguish between an idea
and expression. Only subsequent cases interpreting Baker articulated
the dichotomy,22 though the Supreme Court itself verbally danced
around the distinction between ideas and expressions, without clearly
expressing a dichotomy.23 The Second Circuit more clearly articulated
it in the Dymow v. Bolton,24 where the Court stated:
One of the entities or things which every author tries to insert in
his copyrighted work is a set of ideas; yet ideas as such are not
protected.
Just as a patent affords protection only to the means of reducing
an inventive idea to practice, so the copyright law protects the
means of expressing an idea; and it is as near the whole truth as
generalization can usually reach that, if the same idea can be
expressed in a plurality of totally different manners, a plurality of
copyrights may result, and no infringement will exist.25

In Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp.,26 Judge Hand provided
new nourishment to the doctrine, describing a procedure to
differentiate an idea from an expression, based on the concept of
“abstraction.”27 Plaintiff Nichols copyrighted a play called “Abie’s
Irish Rose,” which told the story of a young couple, from different
religious faiths who married against their families’ wishes.28
Universal Pictures later produced a movie based on this play, though
the movie did not highlight the religious conflicts present in the
play.29 Judge Hand stated: “A comedy based upon conflicts between
Irish and Jews, into which the marriage of their children enters, is no

20. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884); Richard H. Jones,
The Myth of the Idea/Expression Dichotomy in Copyright Law, 10 PACE L. REV. 551, 554
(1990).
21. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
22. See Jones, supra note 20, at 555.
23. Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U.S. 82, 84-86 (1899).
24. Dymow v. Bolton, 11 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1926).
25. Id. at 691 (citing Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55, 56 (1911); Holmes, 174
U.S. 82).
26. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930).
27. See STEPHEN M. MCJOHN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 63-64 (3d ed. 2009); Jones,
supra note 20, at 558.
28. Nichols, 45 F.2d at 120.
29. Id. at 120, 122.
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more susceptible of copyright than the outline of Romeo and Juliet.”30
Thus, anyone is free to convey the same elements in different ways;
as long as one depicts these elements in different forms, one cannot
be found liable for copying. In contrast, infringement occurs if the
author copies most of the dialogues, the characters’ features, as well
as a particular sequence of scenes.31 Judge Hand described levels of
increased abstraction resulting in ever more increased generality in a
work: “[T]here is a point in this series of abstractions where they are
no longer protected, since otherwise the playwright could prevent the
use of his ‘ideas,’ to which, apart from their expression, his property
is never extended.”32
Perhaps the strongest articulation of the idea/expression
dichotomy can be found in Mazer v. Stein,33 where the Court
explicitly stated that copyright protection is granted, not to the idea,
but only to the expression of an idea.34 Afterwards, most cases
involving non-verbatim copying were built on this idea/expression
dichotomy.35
Congress codified the idea/expression dichotomy in the
Copyright Act of 1976, where 17 U.S.C. § 102(b),36 while not
explicitly mentioning the word “expression,” considers it
incorporated.37 In addition, § 102(a) clearly and unequivocally states
that copyright protection can be extended only to “original works of
authorship.”38

30. Id. at 122.
31. Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54-56 (2d Cir. 1936); see also
MCJOHN, supra note 27, at 64.
32. Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121.
33. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
34. Id. at 217 (“[Copyright] protection is given only to the expression of the idea—not
the idea itself.”).
35. See, e.g., M. Kramer Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421, 434-35 (4th Cir. 1986)
(holding that the idea of a poker video game cannot be copyrighted, but the particular shapes,
sizes, colors, sequences, arrangements, and sounds that comprise a specific expression of the
game can be); Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 915 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding
that the copied features of a simple game were solely the mechanical, utilitarian aspects of the
toys); Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 741 (9th Cir. 1971) (holding
that the idea of a jeweled bee pin cannot be copyrighted, and only an exact copy of the pin at
issue would constitute infringement); Jones, supra note 20, at 559.
36. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2011).
37. See Jones, supra note 20, at 560.
38. § 102(a).
Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works of
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later
developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise

MANCINELLA

530

4/18/2013 1:29 AM

SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J.

[Vol. 29

Yet some commentators rightfully argue that the idea/expression
dichotomy is irrelevant to copyright law, because all expressions
emanate from ideas.39 Considering ideas and expressions as two
different categories under copyright protection—non-copyrightable
ideas and copyrightable expressions of those ideas—will not help
judges determine which expressions are indeed protectable and
whether these expressions have been infringed.40
B. The Functionality Exception in Copyright Law and a Brief
Analysis of Some Recent Cases
1. What Does Copyright Mean for Functionality?
Functional elements of works are not subjected to copyright
protection. Clothing is considered inherently functional, and thus
various attempts to copyright articles of clothing have failed.41 The

communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device. Works of
authorship include the following categories:
(1) literary works;
(2) musical works, including any accompanying words;
(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music;
(4) pantomimes and choreographic works;
(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;
(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works;
(7) sound recordings; and
(8) architectural works.
Id. (emphasis added).
39. See, e.g., Jones, supra note 20, at 605-07.
40. See id. at 607.
Since “idea” and “expression” are simply labels applied to the conclusions
reached after a court has examined particular expressions at issue in a case,
merely invoking the dichotomy as justification would be circular. Reasons related
to the originality and creativity involved in devising the form of a writing will
need to be advanced. That the dichotomy appears to be part of a court’s decisionmaking process at all is an illusion. At best, the idea/expression dichotomy is
superfluous; at worst, it disguises the court’s true reasoning as to which
expressions are protectible.
Id.
41. See, e.g., Galiano v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 416 F.3d 411, 422 (5th Cir. 2005)
(providing that clothing designs for casino workers were not copyrightable absent showing that
they were marketable independently of their utilitarian function as casino uniforms); Knitwaves,
Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd., 71 F.3d 996, 1002 (2d Cir. 1995) (stating that clothing has an “intrinsic
utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey
information” and therefore is not copyrightable); Whimsicality, Inc. v. Rubie’s Costume Co.,
891 F.2d 452, 456 (2d Cir. 1989) (noting that a costume could not be protected as a “soft
sculpture” because “[t]he intended depiction is in fact recognizable only when the costume is
worn by a person”).
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Copyright Act, in fact, provides for a peremptory classification of
elements which are not protected by copyright.42 The Supreme Court
in Baker v. Selden43 held that ideas cannot be copyrighted, and as
mentioned above, was later codified in § 102(b). Specifically, the
Baker Court held that possessing the copyright for a book does not
provide its author with an exclusive right to prevent anyone from
using the system described in the book44. Selden owned the copyright
in a book45 which
consist[ed] of an introductory essay explaining the system of bookkeeping referred to, to which [were] annexed certain forms or
banks, consisting of ruled lines, and headings, illustrating the
system and showing how it is to be used and carried out in
practice. This system effect[ed] the same results as book-keeping
by double entry; but, by a peculiar arrangement of columns and
headings, present[ed] the entire operation, of a day, a week, or a
month, on a single page, or on two pages facing each other, in an
account-book.46

Baker “use[d] a similar plan so far as results [were] concerned; but
[made] a different arrangement of the columns, and use[d] different
headings.”47 While Selden alleged that Baker made and used
“account-books arranged on substantially the same system,” he
“fail[ed] to show that [Baker] has violated the copyright of Selden’s
book, regarding the latter merely as an explanatory work.”48
Selden could not protect the accounting method inherent in the
published tables because the method was indispensable from the
overall bookkeeping system.49 In addition, Selden tried to assert
patent protection for this method, without actually obtaining a
patent.50 Copyright protection requires only originality,51 whereas one
of the key requirements of patentability is novelty of the invention.52
42. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2011).
43. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
44. Id. at 104.
45. Id. at 99-100 (“Charles Selden . . . in the year 1859 took the requisite steps for
obtaining the copyright of a book, entitled ‘Selden’s Condensed Ledger, or Book-keeping
Simplified,’ the object of which was to exhibit and explain a peculiar system of bookkeeping.”).
46. Id. at 100.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 101; see also Samuels, supra note 17, at 326-27.
49. Baker, 101 U.S. at 104.
50. Id. at 102.
51. Jones, supra note 20, at 586.
52. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2011).
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Thus, copyright does not protect the use of a method or process but it
might protect its explanation, and thus a manifestation of expressing
the method or process. Furthermore, the Court, analyzing the
difference between the use of a work and its explanation, stated:
[W]hilst no one has a right to print or publish [Selden’s] book, or
any material part thereof, as a book intended to convey instruction
in the art, any person may practise and use the art itself which he
has described and illustrated therein. The use of the art is a totally
different thing from a publication of the book explaining it.53

The Court thus based infringement on the reason for which a copy is
made.54
But an expression might also be uncopyrightable, through a line
of reasoning known as the merger doctrine. The court in Morrissey v.
Proctor & Gamble Co.,55 held the work as not protected by copyright,
and reasoned:
[T]o permit copyrighting would mean that a party or parties, by
copyrighting a mere handful of forms, could exhaust all
possibilities of future use of the substance. In such circumstances it
does not seem accurate to say that any particular form of
expression comes from the subject matter. However, it is necessary
to say that the subject matter would be appropriated by permitting
the copyrighting of its expression. We cannot recognize copyright
as a game of chess in which the public can be checkmated.56

Summarized, Morrissey expresses that an idea and expression can be
so closely linked as to be inseparable, and thus not be copyrightable.
Functional elements cannot be protected under copyright law but
may be patentable. While an element that is original and creative is
copyrightable, an element can only be granted patent protection if it is
functional. Hence, whether copyright or patent law applies revolves
around whether an element is functional or creative.57 Yet a work can
have a protected creative expression and be functional too.58 It is
crucial, however, to distinguish the protected expressive elements
from the unprotected functional aspects.59

53. Baker, 101 U.S. at 104.
54. Samuels, supra note 17, at 327.
55. Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675 (1st Cir. 1967).
56. Id. at 678-79.
57. MCJOHN, supra note 27, at 73-74.
58. Id. at 74.
59. Id. See also Brandir Int’l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1144-45
(2d Cir. 1987) (addressing whether a design for a bicycle rack could be granted a copyright).
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More precisely, every creative element of a work has a function:
a phrase in a poem can “awaken” feelings, for instance. Therefore,
courts usually consider different factors to decide whether or not an
element is functional. One such factor is whether the element
improves the productivity of a process or whether the element is
indispensable for compatibility with other work.60 Another approach
refers to the different categories listed in § 102(b),61 for example,
whether the elements represent a process or a system not subject to
copyright protection.62
As can be seen from cases such as Galiano v. Harrah’s
Operating Co.,63 an essential factor in determining whether clothing is
copyrightable is whether an element is functional or creative. The fact
that functional elements are not protected by copyright is especially
relevant in the context of technology, which has become increasing
vital and prominent in society. For example, today’s advancements in
software allow us to record all events, both small and momentous.64
More generally, the question is: what protection does copyright law
provides for software, given the functional aspects of software?
2. Software Functionality: Oracle v. Google and the
European Court of Justice Decision in SAS v.
World Programming Limited
Copyright law considers clothing a useful article because of its
natural utilitarian function.65 This maxim, however, might be subject

The court explained “conceptual separability,” relying on Prof. Denicola’s article, Applied Art
and Industrial Design: A Suggested Approach to Copyright in Useful Articles, 67 MINN. L. REV.
707, 741-42 (1983), and noted that “if design elements reflect a merger of aesthetic and
functional considerations, the artistic aspects of a work cannot be said to be conceptually
separable from the utilitarian elements. . . . [W]here design elements can be identified as
reflecting the designer’s artistic judgment exercised independently of functional influences,
conceptual separability exists.” Brandir Int’l, Inc., 834 F.2d at 1145. The court denied copyright
protection to the RIBBON rack (the product in question), and stated that “the form of the rack is
influenced in significant measure by utilitarian concerns and thus any aesthetic elements cannot
be said to be conceptually separable from the utilitarian elements. This is true even though the
sculptures which inspired the RIBBON Rack may well have been—the issue of originality
aside—copyrightable.” Id. at 1147. The court added: “In creating the RIBBON Rack, the
designer has clearly adapted the original aesthetic elements to accommodate and further a
utilitarian purpose.” Id.
60. MCJOHN, supra note 27, at 75.
61. Id. at 73.
62. Id.
63. Galiano v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 416 F.3d 411, 415 (5th Cir. 2005).
64. MCJOHN, supra note 27, at 75.
65. STEPHEN M. MCJOHN, COPYRIGHT 136-37 (3d ed. 2012).
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to some exceptions: for instance, a dress worn as a costume might
serve more than a mere utilitarian function.66 In contrast, however,
while clothing can be considered a “useful article,” the same rule
cannot be said for computer programs.67 Computer programs,68
though functional, are eligible for protection as literary works,69 with
some limitations.70
Copyright protection for computer programs raises several
important questions: does copyright law protect programming
languages, data and file formats, and/or the structure of a computer
program? Since copyright protection under 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) does
not cover processes, systems, or methods of operation, which parts of
a computer program are copyrightable? More specifically, which, if
any, of these parts may be copied without infringing copyrightrights?71 Recent cases have touched on these questions72 and have
articulated some limits to the scope of protection for such programs.
In 2005, Sun Microsystems, the developer of the Java
programming language, negotiated over several months the possibility
of licensing Java application programming interfaces (APIs) to
Google for use in developing Google’s Android smart phone
operating system.73 Sun Microsystems was subsequently acquired by
Oracle, and Oracle then sued Google for infringing Java-related
copyrights and patents.74 The jury found that Google had infringed
Oracle’s copyrights in the Java application programming interfaces

66. Id. at 137.
67. Id.
68. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2011) (“A ‘computer program’ is a set of statements or instructions
to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result.”).
69. Id. (“‘Literary works’ are works, other than audiovisual works, expressed in words,
numbers, or other verbal or numerical symbols or indicia, regardless of the nature of the material
objects, such as books, periodicals, manuscripts, phonorecords, film, tapes, disks, or cards, in
which they are embodied.”). However, computer programs are subjected to copyright protection
whether in source code, object code, or other form. See generally MCJOHN, supra note 65, at
128-33.
70. § 117; see also MCJOHN, supra note 27, at 76.
71. See Barry Sookman, So You Want to Protect Computer Programs by Copyright, the
Oracle v Google and SAS v WPL Cases, BARRY SOOKMAN (June 3, 2012),
http://www.barrysookman.com/2012/06/03/so-you-want-to-protect-computer-programs-bycopyright-oracle-v-google-and-the-sas-v-wpl-cases/.
72. See, e.g., Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 872 F. Supp. 2d 974 (N.D. Cal. 2012);
Case C-406/10, SAS Inst. Inc. v. World Programming Ltd., 2012 E.C.R. (not yet published),
available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=122362&pageInd
ex=0&doclang=EN&mode=doc&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=710990.
73. Oracle Am., Inc., 872 F. Supp. 2d at 978.
74. Id. at 975.
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(APIs), but was unable to resolve whether Google’s copying was fair
use, a defense to the infringement claim. 75 In the second phase of the
trial, however, the jury did not find any patent infringement by
Google.76 Specifically, the jury found that Android, Google’s smart
phone operating system, did not infringe two Oracle patents.77 In the
end, however, the district court rejected Oracle’s claims of
infringement of the APIs:
To accept Oracle’s claim would be to allow anyone to copyright
one version of code to carry out a system of commands and
thereby bar all others from writing their own different versions to
carry out all or part of the same commands. No holding has ever
endorsed such a sweeping proposition.78

The Java API “is composed of keywords and other symbols and
a set of pre-written programs to carry out various commands.”79 Judge
Alsup distinguished the function that each command carries out from
the specific code used to implement that command, and held that
while the underlying code could be copyrighted,80 the names and
structure of the commands are intrinsically tied to their operation, and
thus are functional and cannot be copyrighted.81
This decision is of vital importance, since it might change how
software programmers will use programming languages, including
Java,82 when developing their own programs. In October 2012, both
Oracle and Google filed notices of appeals to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.83 In February 2013, Oracle filed its
opening brief.84 The litigation is ongoing, and it is also quite possible
that this case may even reach the U.S. Supreme Court in the next few
years.

75. Id. at 975-76; see also Sookman, supra note 71.
76. Brittany Horth, Jury Decides Google Did Not Infringe Oracle Patents but Question of
Whether APIs Can Be Copyrighted Remains, JOLT DIG. (May 30, 2012),
http://www3.law.harvard.edu/journals/jolt/2012/05/30/oracle-america-inc-v-google-inc/.
77. U.S. Patent No. RE38,104 E (filed Mar. 3, 1999); U.S. Patent No. 6,061,520 (filed
Apr. 7, 1998).
78. Oracle Am., Inc., 872 F. Supp. 2d at 1002.
79. Id. at 977.
80. Id. at 997.
81. Id.
82. Horth, supra note 76.
83. Plaintiff Oracle America, Inc.’s Notice of Appeal, Oracle Am., Inc., 872 F. Supp. 2d
974 (No. 3:10-cv-03561-WHA); Notice of Appeal, Oracle Am., Inc., 872 F. Supp. 2d 974 (No.
3:10-cv-03561-WHA).
84. Opening Brief and Addendum of Plaintiff-Appellant, Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc.,
No. 13-01021 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 13, 2013).
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Recently, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) also decided that
the functionality of software cannot receive copyright protection.85
This case raised several questions, among them whether Article 1(2)
of Directive 91/25086 must be interpreted to mean that the
functionality of a computer program represents a form of expression
and, thus can receive copyright protection.87 The ECJ said no, and
stated:
[N]either the functionality of a computer program nor the
programming language and the format of data files used in a
computer program in order to exploit certain of its functions
constitute a form of expression of that program for the purposes of
Article 1(2) of Directive 91/250.

...
Consequently, . . . Article 1(2) of Directive 91/250 must be
interpreted as meaning that neither the functionality of a computer
program nor the programming language and the format of data
files used in a computer program in order to exploit certain of its
functions constitute a form of expression of that program and, as
such, are not protected by copyright in computer programs for the
purposes of that directive.88

By deciding that functionality of software cannot receive
copyright protection, the ECJ set limitations on the ways in which
vendors can bind customers under licensing agreements89:
[T]he owner of the copyright in a computer program may not
prevent, by relying on the licensing agreement, the person who has
obtained that licence from determining the ideas and principles
which underlie all the elements of that program in the case where
that person carries out acts which that licence permits him to
perform and the acts of loading and running necessary for the use
of the computer program, and on condition that that person does
not infringe the exclusive rights of the owner in that program.90

85. See Case C-406/10, SAS Inst. Inc. v. World Programming Ltd., 2012 E.C.R. (not yet
published), available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=12236
2&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=doc&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=710990.
86. Council Directive 91/250 on the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, art. 1, 1991
O.J.
(L
122)
42,
44
(EC),
available
at
http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:1991:122:0042:0046:EN:PDF.
87. Horth, supra note 76.
88. SAS Inst. Inc., 2012 E.C.R. ¶¶ 39, 46.
89. Richard Chirgwin, Software Functionality Not Subject to Copyright: EU Court, THE
REGISTER (May 3, 2012), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2012/05/03/wpl_vs_sas_eu_court/.
90. See SAS Inst. Inc., 2012 E.C.R. ¶ 59 (emphasis added).
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In addition, in citing Article 5(3) of Directive 91/250 on the legal
protection of computer programs91 the ECJ stated that “[i]deas and
principles which underlie any element of a computer program,
including those which underlie its interfaces, are not protected by
copyright under [Article 1 of Directive 91/250].”92 Thus, in contrast
to the holding in Oracle, in the European Union a company can
license the code that implements the functionality of a programming
language, and reuse that code verbatim without violating copyright
law.93
This holding that a competitor of SAS can develop a product that
“incorporates features of SAS” by using SAS’s own language
represents a significant success “for software developers in Europe
and should mean ‘owners’ of [programming] languages . . . cannot
claim ownership of programs built using a specific language.”94
3. Useful Articles: The Distinction Between Separability
and Functionality
Copyright law does not protect ideas but only those original and
creative works of authorship “fixed in any tangible medium of
expression . . . from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or
otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine
or device.”95 This means that, if painted today, the canvas that has
painted upon it The Birth of Venus would receive copyright
protection, even though it is an embodiment (“tempera”) of an idea
that Botticelli had in his mind. And all creative works, of course, are
inherently based on, and incorporate, ideas. For example, the artistic
technique of fresco, a method of laying pigment into fresh plaster,
was masterfully applied by two of the most famous artists of the
Italian High Renaissance Art: Raffaello Sanzio da Urbino (known as
Raphael), in painting one of his magna opera La Scuola di Atene
(1508-1511),96 and Michelangelo di Lodovico Buonarroti Simoni

91. Council Directive 91/250, supra note 86, art. 5.
92. See SAS Inst. Inc., 2012 E.C.R. ¶ 31.
93. See Lawrence Latif, EU Court Rules Programming Languages Cannot Be
Copyrighted, THE INQUIRER (May 2, 2012), http://www.theinquirer.net/inquirer/news/2172127/
eu-court-rules-programming-languages-copyrighted.
94. Id.
95. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2011).
96. Pope Giulio II commissioned La Scuola di Atene (The School of Athens) from
Raphael, who painted it in the Pope’s private library, called Stanza della Segnatura. Raphael
realized four frescoes, one for each wall, each depicting a humanistic art: La Scuola di Atene is
dedicated to philosophy, and walls represent Theology, Justice, and Poetry. See Room of the
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(commonly known as Michelangelo), in his masterpiece Il Giudizio
Universale (1536-1541).97 Both paintings embody the fresco method
of painting, but if painted today the fact that both embody this method
would still allow them to be protected: “[I]n truly creative works, the
aesthetic features of the work either dominate or may be separated
from the ideas or methods embodied therein.”98 At the time these
works were painted, however, they were unprotected not because of
the nature of their embodiment, but because there was no copyright
law.
Following this line of reasoning, Congress amended the
Copyright Act with the explicit intention to prevent copyright
protection for useful articles.99 A “useful article” is protectable only if
its aesthetic peculiarities are separable from its utilitarian function,100
in which case only the aesthetic aspects can receive copyright
protection.101 Unlike trademark law, “in copyright law it is precisely
the utilitarian and non-aesthetic aspect of apparel and shoes that
leaves fashion design unprotected from copying.”102 Professor
Segnatura
(1508-1511),
VATICAN
MUSEUMS,
http://mv.vatican.va/3_EN/pages/SDR/SDR_03_SalaSegn.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2013).
97. Michelangelo painted Il Giudizio Universale (The Last Judgment) on the altar wall of
the Sistine Chapel. It was commissioned by Pope Clement VII, who died before it was
completed. BERNADINE BARNES, MICHELANGELO’S LAST JUDGMENT: THE RENAISSANCE
RESPONSE 4-5 (1998).
98. Martin P. Michael, Partner, Sonnenschein Nath & Rosenthal LLP, PowerPoint Panel
Presentation at the Intellectual Property Owners Annual Meeting 2007: US Copyright Law—
Separability/Functionality: A Big Hurdle for Most Industrial Designs, slide 4 (Sept. 11, 2007),
available at http://www.ipo.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Calendar&Template=/CM/Content
Display.cfm&ContentID=16122 (explaining the distinction between separability and
functionality).
99. Id. slide 5.
100. Brandir Int’l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1144-45 (2d Cir.
1987).
101. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2011) (“[T]he design of a useful article . . . shall be considered a
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work only if, and only to the extent that, such design
incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified separately from, and
are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article.”) (emphasis
added); see also Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1980)
(holding that decorative belt buckles could be copyrighted because of their primary ornamental
aspects that were conceptually separate from their subsidiary utilitarian function).
102. Jeannie Suk, Little Red (Litigious) Shoes, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/22/opinion/sunday/louboutin-and-the-little-red-litigiousshoes.html?_r=0#. The question of whether a color could be trademarked by a fashion designer
was addressed by federal courts in 2012. See Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent
Am. Holding, Inc., 696 F.3d 206 (2d Cir. 2012). The fashion house Christian Louboutin had
applied for and obtained a valid trademark for a particular shade of red, placed on the soles of
women’s high-end shoes. Id. at 211-13. Yves Saint Laurent (YSL), in 2011, introduced a line of
shoes that also featured red soles. Id. at 213. Louboutin requested a temporary injunction
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Buccafusco claims that copyright law usually involves works creating
an aesthetic interest that involves sight and sounds, whereas touch and
taste generally accompanies invention protected under patent law.103
Yet one could envision extending copyright protection to works of
authorship that appeal to all the senses: sight, smell, taste, touch, and
hearing.
Knowing if a work is a useful article is important especially
because of different interpretations of the separability doctrine, which
governs the “general exclusion of functionality from copyright.”104
Courts have articulated different approaches to the separability rule:
most require conceptual separability,105 which means that one is able
to conceptualize the creative element of a work as existing on its own,
separate from the functional object the creative element is associated
with. Other courts require physical separability106: “[W]e have not
doubted that when a component of a useful article can actually be
removed from the original item and separately sold, without adversely
impacting the article’s functionality, that physically separable design

prohibiting YSL from selling red-soled shoes, id. at 213-14, but district court Judge Marrero
denied the request, holding that a color cannot be trademarked in fashion: “[Color] elementally
performs a creative function; it aims to please or be useful, not to identify and advertise a
commercial source.” Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am., Inc., 778 F.Supp.2d
445, 452 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, and remanded by Christian Louboutin
S.A., 696 F.3d 206. Some commentators criticized the trial court decision for not clarifying
when a color is a design element and when it is a trademark. Louboutin v YSL: Lay Off My RedSoled Shoes, THE ECONOMIST (Aug. 20, 2011), http://www.economist.com/node/21526357. The
decision also runs contrary to cases that have held the color could be trademarked. See, e.g.,
Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159 (1995) (green-gold color for dry cleaning
press pads could be trademarked); In re Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 774 F.2d 1116 (Fed.
Cir. 1985) (pink color for fiberglass insulation was not barred from trademark registration);
Société des Produits Nestlé S.A. v. Cadbury UK Ltd., [2012] EWHC (Ch) 2637 (Eng.) (purple
color for chocolate wrappers was allowed to be registered as trademarks). The Second Circuit
also disagreed with the Judge Marrero. See Christian Louboutin S.A., 696 F.3d 206. It did not
grant the injunction; instead, it remanded the case to the district court holding that Louboutin
had a valid trademark (although only for the red shoe soles, and not for a shoe that is entirely
red, as YSL’s supposedly infringing shoe was). See id. at 228-29. At the same time, Louboutin
lost on the same issue against Zara in the France’s highest court—Cour de Cassation. See
Charlotte Cowles, Christian Louboutin Loses Another Red-Sole Lawsuit, This Time in France,
THE CUT (June 11, 2012, 3:00 PM), http://nymag.com/thecut/2012/06/louboutin-lost-anotherred-sole-lawsuit.html.
103. Christopher J. Buccafusco, Making Sense of Intellectual Property Law, 97 CORNELL
L. REV. 501, 505-06 (2012).
104. MCJOHN, supra note 27, at 81.
105. See, e.g., Jovani Fashion, Ltd. v. Fiesta Fashions, No. 12-598-cv, 2012 WL 4856412
(2d. Cir. Oct. 15, 2012); Pivot Point Int’l, Inc. v. Charlene Prods., Inc., 372 F.3d 913 (7th Cir.
2004).
106. See Michael, supra note 98, slides 10-20.
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element may be copyrighted.”107 While the functional aspects of a
work can be protected by a patent, the same functional elements
cannot receive both patent and copyright protection.108
Conceptual separability is illustrated in cases such as Gay Toys,
Inc. v. Buddy L Corp.109 in which the district court found a toy
airplane not protectable by copyright because toys are useful articles
that permit “a child to dream and to let his or her imagination soar”.110
The Court of Appeals reversed, stating:
[A] toy airplane is merely a model which portrays a real airplane.
To be sure, a toy airplane is to be played with and enjoyed, but a
painting of an airplane, which is copyrightable, is to be looked at
and enjoyed. Other than the portrayal of a real airplane, a toy
airplane, like a painting, has no intrinsic utilitarian function.
This interpretation is supported by legislative history as
well. . . . The function of toys is much more similar to that of
works of art than it is to the “intrinsic utilitarian function” of
industrial products.
Indeed, under the district court’s reasoning, virtually any
“pictorial, graphic, and sculptural work” would not be
copyrightable as a “useful article.”111

Similarly, one court found that nose masks are not “useful
articles” as defined by 17 U.S.C. § 101,112 and are therefore
protectable as sculptural works.113 As in Gay Toys, the Third Circuit
reversed the lower court’s decision, noting:
That nose masks are meant to be worn by humans to evoke
laughter does not distinguish them from clearly copyrightable
works of art like paintings. When worn by a human being, a nose
mask may evoke chuckles and guffaws from onlookers. When
hung on a wall, a painting may evoke a myriad of human emotions,
but we would not say that the painting is not copyrightable because
107. Chosun Int’l, Inc. v. Chrisha Creations, Ltd., 413 F.3d 324, 329 (2d Cir. 2005)
(emphasis added).
108. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 218 (1954) (“The copyright protects originality rather
than novelty or invention-conferring only ‘the sole right of multiplying copies.’ . . . The
dichotomy of protection for the aesthetic is not beauty and utility but art for the copyright and
the invention of original and ornamental design for design patents.”) (footnote omitted).
109. Gay Toys, Inc. v. Buddy L Corp., 703 F.2d 970 (6th Cir. 1983).
110. Id. at 973 (quoting Gay Toys, Inc. v. Buddy L Corp., 522 F. Supp. 622, 625 (E.D.
Mich. 1981)).
111. Gay Toys, Inc., 703 F.2d at 973.
112. Masquerade Novelty, Inc. v. Unique Indus., Inc., 912 F.2d 663, 670 (3d Cir. 1990).
113. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5) (2011) (listing sculptural works as subject matter protected by
copyright).
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its artistic elements could not be separated from the emotional
effect its creator hoped it would have on persons viewing it. The
utilitarian nature of an animal nose mask or a painting of the
crucifixion of Jesus Christ inheres solely in its appearance,
regardless of the fact that the nose mask’s appearance is intended
to evoke mirth and the painting’s appearance a feeling of religious
reverence.114

Prior to the passage of the 1976 Copyright Act, C.F.R.
§ 202.10(c) provided the definition for a useful article, describing it as
one in which its “sole intrinsic function” is its utility.115 Section 101
of the 1976 Copyright Act, however, only uses the words “intrinsic
function” to describe useful articles.116 In Kieselstein, the Court
observed that: “Congress in the 1976 Act may have somewhat
narrowed the sweep of the former regulations by defining a ‘useful
article’ as one with ‘an intrinsic utilitarian function,’ . . . instead of
one, in the words of the old regulations, with utility as its ‘sole
intrinsic function’ . . . .”117
Courts therefore need not determine whether an article’s function
is solely utilitarian. Rather, an article with an intrinsic utilitarian
function is eligible for copyright protection if its artistic
characteristics can be separated and can independently exist as a work
of art, separate from the function of the article.118
An example of an article that is intrinsically utilitarian that at the
same time has artistic characteristic is fabric: designs printed on fabric
can be copyrighted.119 Yet, incongruously, the design of a dress,
114. Masquerade Novelty, Inc., 912 F.2d at 671.
115. 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(c) (19) (repealed 1978) (“If the sole intrinsic function of an article
is its utility, the fact that the article is unique and attractively shaped will not qualify it as a work
of art. However, if the shape of a utilitarian article incorporates features, such as artistic
sculpture, carving, or pictorial representation, which can be identified separately and are capable
of existing independently as a work of art, such features will be eligible for registration.”)
116. THOMAS G. FIELD, JR., INTRODUCTION TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: CASES &
MATERIALS 191 (2003).
117. Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989, 993 (2d Cir. 1980)
(citing 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976); 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(c) (1977) (repealed 1978)).
118. Carol Barnhart, Inc. v. Econ. Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1985). The court
stated that an article with ornamental features is not copyrightable. Id at 418. Judge Newman’s
dissenting opinion took a different approach, affirming that the distinction between function and
aesthetics, indispensable to obtain copyright protection, is only conceptual. Id. at 422. Hence the
ornamental characteristics should be copyrightable if function and aesthetics are conceptually
separable for a reasonable observer. Id. In this case, the features should be protected by
copyright because an observer could see the mannequins’ ornamental qualities without
envisaging the function of the mannequins themselves. Id. at 422-423.
119. See, e.g., Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 490 (2d Cir.
1960).
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which can exist independently as a work of art, cannot be
copyrighted. This is so because copyright law has not budged from
the stance that the main purpose is “just” to cover a person’s body,
and decoration is only a secondary purpose.120 Lack of protection
creates a fertile breeding grown for design piracy. To avoid design
piracy, the law should be better to protect fashion designers’ rights.
III. IS A NEW ERA FOR DESIGNERS STARTING? THE E.U. DESIGN
REGULATION AND THE AMERICAN FASHION DESIGN BILL
A. The E.U. Community Design Regulation: A Breath of Fresh
Air for European Design
In 2001 the European Council adopted the Community Design
Regulation.121 This Regulation provides a uniform system of
protection for designs.122 While the intent of this Regulation is to
improve the free movement of goods, it has the consequential effect
of combating counterfeiting,123 a problem that certain Community
Member States have been attempting to tackle on their own.124
120. See Charles F. Reidelbach & Christina Wilson, Protect Your Work: Copyright Your
Clothing Designs, HIGGS, FLETCHER & MACK LLP NEWSLETTER, Apr. 2002.
121. See Council Regulation 6/2002, 2002 O.J. (L 3) 1 (EC) [hereinafter Community
Design
Regulation],
available
at
http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2002:003:0001:0024:EN:PDF; see also
Commission Regulation 2245/2002, 2002 O.J. (L 341) 28 (EC), available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2002:341:0028:0053:EN:PDF
(implementing Community Design Regulation).
122. Community Design Regulation, supra note 121, art. 3(a).
123. In Europe and especially in France, which provides the strongest standard of
protection, original designs can receive protection; but because most clothing lacks originality,
most fashion designs are freely imitated. See Guillermo C. Jimenez, Fashion Law: Overview of
a New Legal Discipline, in FASHION LAW: A GUIDE FOR DESIGNERS, FASHION EXECUTIVES,
AND ATTORNEYS 3, 16-17 (Guillermo C. Jimenez & Barbara Kolsun eds., 2010); Donald L.
Kreindler, Selling and Buying: Commercial Agreements in the Fashion Sector, in FASHION
LAW: A GUIDE FOR DESIGNERS, FASHION EXECUTIVES, AND ATTORNEYS, supra, at 170.
124. On May 9, 2012, the Italian Minister of Economic Development, Infrastructure, and
Transport, received a plan to combat counterfeiting from the Anti-Counterfeiting National
Council (CNAC). See Lotta Contraffazione: Presentato Piano Strategico, CNAC Individua
Prioritá [Combating Counterfeiting: Presenting the Strategic Plan and Identifying Priorities],
MINISTERO
DELLO
SVILUPPO
ECONOMICO
(May
14,
2012),
http://www.uibm.gov.it/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2005757%3Alottacontraffazione-presentato-piano-strategico-cnac-individua-priorita&catid=10%3Anotizie&lang=it (It.). The strategic plan lists a set of priorities to combat
counterfeiting that were identified by thirteen committees operating under the CNAC, 150
experts, and more than seventy organizations from the enterprise, consumer, and government
sectors. Id. The CNAC’s President enunciated macro priorities in six areas: communication and
information, enforcement, reinforcement of the territorial defense, company training, combating
counterfeiting on the Internet, and protection of the “Made in Italy” label from the effects of
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Counterfeiting, however, is an expensive, global problem,125 and
foreign encroachment. Id. The Council of Legal Experts divided the most pressing issues into
two categories: legislative measures and organizational/institutional measures. Id. Action plans
for the anti-counterfeiting efforts presented in the Strategic Plan will be submitted by the end of
2012. Id. In addition, the Italian Ministry of Economic Development−General Directorate for
Combating Counterfeiting−Italian Patent and Trademark Office (UIBM) and the National
Association of Italian Municipalities (ANCI) signed on December 30, 2010 an agreement that
establishes territorial initiatives aimed at promoting, coordinating and monitoring activities to
combat counterfeiting and to manage computerized data. See Anticontraffazione—Disponsibile
L’Avviso Pubblico per i Comuni [Anti-Counterfeiting—Public Notice for Municipalities],
MINISTERO
DELLO
SVILUPPO
ECONOMICO,
http://www.uibm.gov.it/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2005911%3Aantico
ntraffazione-disponibile-lavviso-pubblico-per-i-comuni-&lang=it (last visited Feb. 24, 2013)
(It.). This agreement allocates resources amounting to € 1.5 million to municipalities for anticounterfeiting actions; the municipalities have requested financing for activities relating to
prevention and combating of counterfeiting, for promoting a culture of legality, and for
dissemination of accurate information on counterfeit products. Id. To ensure participation by
municipalities in the agreement, and to give maximum publicity on the national level, ANCI has
prepared and published a notice addressed to the Italian Municipalities. Id. On Monday, October
22, 2012, Censis—an Italian research institute—presented in Rome the results of its
counterfeiting research. Ricerca Censis−MSE Sulla Contraffazione [Censis-MSE Counterfeiting
Study],
MINISTERO
DELLO
SVILUPPO
ECONOMICO
(Oct.
12,
2012),
http://www.uibm.gov.it/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2006012%3Aricerca
-censis-mse-sulla-contraffazione&lang=it (It.). The presentation was an important opportunity to
evaluate and assess various policies and interventions in the fight against counterfeiting and
actions to be undertaken in the near future. Id. The research conducted by Censis—three years in
the making— analyzes the extent and harmful economic effects (in terms of lost tax revenue,
lost jobs, etc.) of counterfeiting phenomenon, which now extends to more and more sectors:
clothing, footwear, jewelry, toys, cosmetics, medicines, and many others. Id. According to the
survey, counterfeiting is considered the cause of 110,000 lost jobs and a loss of €1.7 billion in
revenue for the treasury. See Falso, in Italia Brucia 100mila Posti di Lavoro [Counterfeits, in
Italy Effect 100,000 Jobs], CORRIERE DELLA SERA (Oct. 22, 2012, 12:33 PM),
http://www.corriere.it/cronache/12_ottobre_22/costi-contraffazione_2fc520cc-1c32-11e2-b6dab1ba2a76be41.shtml (It.). Counterfeiting significantly affects various sectors of the Italian
economy: counterfeiting in cosmetics, for example, increased at least 15 times in 10 years. See
id.
On January 24, 2013, the European Parliament endorsed a new Regulation 5129/2013/EC
which sets out customs procedures for goods suspected of infringing intellectual property rights
and replaces Council Regulation 1383/2003, 2003 O.J. (L196) 7 (EC). The new Regulation will
come into force on January 1, 2014. See generally Desiree Fields & Rohan Massey, New EU
Counterfeit Goods Regulation, JD SUPRA LAW NEWS (Jan. 28, 2013),
http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/new-eu-counterfeit-goods-regulation-73695/; Axel H. Horns,
New Proposal for EU Regulation Concerning Customs Enforcement Of Intellectual Property
Rights, KSNH:LAW (Jan. 11, 2013), http://blog.ksnh.eu/en/2013/01/11/new-proposal-for-euregulation-concerning-customs-enforcement-of-intellectual-property-rights/.
125. See The Truth About Counterfeiting, INT’L ANTI-COUNTERFEITING COALITION,
http://www.iacc.org/about-counterfeiting/the-truth-about-counterfeiting.php (last visited Feb.
24, 2013) (“In Fiscal Year 2011, US Customs & Border Protection (CBP) and Immigration &
Customs Enforcement (ICE) seized nearly $200 Million worth of counterfeit goods intended for
sale in the United States.”). Counterfeiting also contributes to unemployment, costs U.S.
businesses billions annually, and reduces tax revenue. See About Counterfeiting, INT’L ANTICOUNTERFEITING COALITION, http://www.iacc.org/about-counterfeiting/ (last visited Feb. 24,
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uniformity of protection across the European Union removes one easy
route for counterfeiters.
This new legislation is especially significant in light of the
increasing importance of designs and models in European
commerce.126 In some countries, like Italy,127 design underlies the
2013). In addition, the growth of counterfeiting is also due to a consumer complicity. See the
Truth
about
Counterfeiting,
INT’L
ANTI-COUNTERFEITING
COALITION,
http://www.iacc.org/about-counterfeiting/the-truth-about-counterfeiting.php (last visited Feb.
24, 2013) (“[Trafficking of counterfeit goods] is driven in part by CONSUMER DEMAND.”).
See generally PEGGY CHAUDHRY & ALAN ZIMMERMAN, THE ECONOMICS OF COUNTERFEIT
TRADE: GOVERNMENTS, CONSUMERS, PIRATES AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 63-74
(2009); PAUL R. PARADISE, TRADEMARK COUNTERFEITING, PRODUCT PIRACY, AND THE
BILLION DOLLAR THREAT TO THE U.S. ECONOMY (1999); THORSTEN STAAKE & ELGAR
FLEISCH, COUNTERING COUNTERFEIT TRADE: ILLICIT MARKET INSIGHTS, BEST PRACTICE
STRATEGIES, AND MANAGEMENT TOOLBOX 47-65 (2008).
In 2011, the American fashion house Tory Burch LLC was awarded $164 million in damages
against forty-one counterfeiters for selling online counterfeiting products bearing the Tory
Burch trademark. See Owen J. McKeon, District Court Awards Tory Burch $164 Million in
Anti-Counterfeiting Litigation, IP LAW ALERT (June 13, 2011, 12:34 PM),
http://www.iplawalert.com/2011/06/articles/ecommerce/district-court-awards-tory-burch-164million-in-anticounterfeiting-litigation/. On October 3, 2012 Tory Burch LLC filed a complaint
for trademark infringement against Creative Eyewear Inc., claiming that the sunglasses
manufacturer has made a fake version of her sunglasses by using unauthorized reproduction of
her registered trademark. Plaintiff’s Complaint for Damages, Tory Burch LLC v. Creative
Eyewear, Inc., No. 12 CIV 7422 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 2012), 2012 WL 4513173; see also Victoria
Slind-Flor, Apple, Tory, Restoration Hardware: Intellectual Property, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 4,
2012, 9:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-10-04/apple-tory-restoration-hardwareintellectual-property.html. More recently, Tory Burch LLC filed a complaint against Bluebell
Accessories for allegedly selling knock-offs with the designer’s signature “TT” logo. Original
Complaint, Tory Burch LLC v. Bluebell Accessories, Inc., No. 1:13-cv-01941-RA (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 22, 2013), 2013 WL 1285764.
The Federal Court of Canada awarded two luxury goods companies CA$2.48 million in
damages. See Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Singga Enters. (Can.) Inc., 2011 FC 776 (Can.
Ont.), available at http://decisions.fct-cf.gc.ca/en/2011/2011fc776/2011fc776.pdf (finding
trademark infringement by the defendants and awarding damages to plaintiffs Louis Vuitton and
Burberry); see also The Federal Court Applies Its New Summary Trial Rules in the Largest AntiCounterfeiting Award in Canadian History, SMART & BIGGAR/FETHERSTONHAUGH (July 27,
2011),
http://www.smart-biggar.ca/en/articles_detail.cfm?news_id=473.
This
decision
represents the largest Canadian award in a trademark and copyright counterfeiting case. Jessica
Braude & Jessica Fingerhut, Landmark Counterfeiting Case Awards Louis Vuitton and Burberry
$2.5 Million in Damages: Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Singga Enterprises (Canada) Inc.,
CASSELS BROCK LAW. (July 21, 2011), http://www.casselsbrock.com/CBArticle/Landmark_Co
unterfeiting_Case_Awards_Louis_Vuitton_and_Burberry__2_5_Million_in_Damages____i_Lo
uis_Vuitton_Malletier_S_A__v__Singga_Enterprises__Canada__Inc___i_.
126. See, e.g., International Filings up in 2012, Says WIPO, SOCIETÀ ITALIANA BREVETTI
(Mar. 27, 2013), http://www.sib.it/en/news-and-events/news/957.html (noting that international
design applications grew in 2012 from the previous year, with a total 12,454 applications, with
the top four countries of origin being Germany (31.7%), Switzerland (19.6%), France (11.4%)
and Italy (7.4%, with a 46.1% growth from 2011)).
127. The inscription on the Palazzo della Civiltà Italiana, also known as the Square
Colosseum, in Rome, Italy, reads: “A nation of poets, artists, heroes, saints, thinkers, scientists,
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excellence of a product and manifests an artistic heritage that merits
strong protection. For several sectors of the Italian economy,
including the furniture, footwear and clothing industry, as well as
other areas of arts and crafts, the protection of industrial design
assumes a vital importance.128 Design is an integral part of ideas
artistic and cultural expression, and defines a country’s artistic
identity and contribution to the world. Sometimes, a design object can
even be considered as a work of art.129 As such, many countries are
associated with particular styles that embody their cultural traditions,
sometimes based on specific historical events.130 For example,
Scandinavian design is easily identifiable by its simple and unique
style, incorporating minimalism, functionalism, and the use of
wood.131 Swedish design registrations cover a wide variety of

sailors, transmigrants.” (translated from Italian by the author).
128. See Marina Benassi, Una Nuova Tutela dall’Europa per Modelli Industriali e Design
[A New Protection from Europe for the Industrial Models and Design], ALTALEX (Feb. 5,
2002), http://www.altalex.com/index.php?idnot=4058 (It.).
129. On September 13, 2012 the Court of Milan addressed copyright as applied to
industrial design. See Trib., 13 Settembre 2012, Foro it. 2012, V, Sezione Specializzata (It.),
available at http://www.trevisancuonzo.com/static/upload/cou/court-of-milan—-decision-no.9917.12.pdf. The court held that the “Panton Chair”, the famous plastic chair produced by
furniture manufacturer Vitra, cannot be reproduced because it is protected as a work of art. Id. at
39. This case further established the criteria to follow in order to distinguish an object of design
as a work of art. The court stated that Panton chair is unanimously recognized a capacity which
represents also the artistic trends of the constitutive movement of the post-war industrial design.
Id. at 34. The court ordered the defendant High Tech to withdraw all the copies from the market
and to pay damages to Vitra. Id. at 50-51.
130. In Italy in the 1950s, aviation engineers established themselves as designers. Two
iconic designs, the Vespa, and the Lambretta (also two of the most important postwar scooters)
were designed by Corradino D’Ascanio and Cesare Pallavicino, both aeronautical engineers and
not motorcycle designers. See Alberto Bassi, L’America in Italia: L’Aspetto del Design Durante
il Boom Economico [America in Italy: The Look of Design During the Economic Boom],
ALBERTO BASSI (Feb. 7, 2011), http://www.albertobassi.it/?p=76 (It.). In the field of airplane
design, Filippo Zappata designed some of the most beautiful seaplanes in aeronautical history.
Id. He is most well-known for the BZ308 (a four-engine, 80-passenger plane for civil aviation)
commissioned by Italian mechanical manufacturer Breda in the late 1940s. Id.
131. Scandinavian design is well-known as a symbol of perfect liaison between
functionality and aesthetics. See generally Katrín Eyþórsdóttir, The Story of Scandinavian
Design: Combining Function and Aesthetics, SMASHING MAG. (June 13, 2011),
http://www.smashingmagazine.com/2011/06/13/the-story-of-scandinavian-design-combiningfunction-and-aesthetics/. It arose as a reaction to the artistic movements immediately prior. The
design appeared at the beginning of 1900s as “decorative art.” This term carries with it an
aesthetic meaning, by implying a new approach to work based on mass production at low cost.
The people of Northern Europe are very linked to their roots and traditions, which explains the
high use of wood in Scandinavian industrial production. Indeed, Sweden and Norway are
densely forested which permit an unlimited quantity of timber. In the past centuries stone was
difficult to extract from the frozen ground, and houses that were built with it were not easy to
heat. For these reasons, the use of wood became common even before the Viking Age. The
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products,132 such as a truck that received design protection for the
actual vehicles as well as for toy versions.
Recognizing the importance of design protection, the World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) provides a registration
system for industrial designs through the Hague Agreement
Concerning the International Registration of Industrial Designs.133
Registering a design provides protection in all countries that are
signatories to the Hague Agreement, and is accomplished by filing a
single application in one language and paying one set of fees.134 The
protection provided by the Hague Agreement, however, is limited to
member countries, such as Denmark and Norway; key markets, such
as Sweden, are not members. The Hague Agreement is also limited to
industrial designs.135
Before enactment of the new Regulation, the European legal
landscape was not uniform with respect to design protection.136 The

Vikings were extraordinary shipbuilders who developed incredible techniques in order to
guarantee a long life to their wooden houses, thanks to their knowledge about wood which gave
it a spiritual meaning. See generally Arte e Cultura Svezia, Norvegia, Danimarca [Art and
Culture of Sweden, Norway, and Denmark], LA GUIDA VERDE MICHELIN,
http://viaggi.viamichelin.it/web/Cultura/Svezia_Norvegia_Danimarca/Arte_e_cultura
(last
visited Oct. 26, 2012) (It.).
132. See Designs, SWEDISH PATENT & REGISTRATION OFFICE (PRV),
www.prv.se/en/Designs/ (last visited Oct. 2, 2012).
133. The Hague System for the International Registration of Industrial Designs,
administered by the International Bureau of the World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO), is based on three separate Acts: the London Act of June 2, 1934, the Hague Act of
November 28, 1960, and the Geneva Act of July 2, 1999. See Hague Agreement Concerning the
International Registration of Industrial Designs, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG.,
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/registration/hague/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2013).
134. See Common Regulations Under the 1999 Act and the 1960 Act of the Hague
Agreement, ch. 2, r. 7 (as in force on January 1, 2012), available at
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/hague/en/legal_texts/pdf/hague_common_regulations.pdf
. Because the European Union is a signatory to the Hague Agreement, it is possible to obtain
industrial design protection under WIPO, in addition to Community design protection. See
International Registrations Designating the European Community (EC), OFFICE FOR
HARMONIZATION IN THE INTERNAL MARKET (TRADE MARKS & DESIGNS),
http://oami.europa.eu/ows/rw/pages/RCD/protection/intRegistrations.en.do (last updated July 9,
2008).
135. See Hague Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Industrial
Designs, supra note 133.
136. Intellectual property exclusive rights conferred by the national laws have a territorial
nature. In relation to intra-Community trade, this connotation determines a fragmentation of the
European market in many sub-national markets. More specifically, in matters of design, the
diversity of national laws determined different forms of protection for the holders of the same
rights within the European Union. This uncomfortable situation changed the conditions of
competition and hence an action from the lawmaker was evident. See DEBORA BRAMBILLA, LA
FORMA DEL PRODOTTO E LA SUA TUTELA [THE SHAPE OF A PRODUCT AND ITS PROTECTION]
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same pair of shoes or glasses could be protected in one country but
not in another, or was not even protected at all, or they could be
protected in various ways, depending on the member state from which
they are exported.137 This state of uncertainty caused a lack of trust
and hindered trade among the Community’s member states.138
The Council Regulation protects a design in two different ways:
as a registered Community design (RCD) and as an unregistered
Community design (UCD).139 A designer acquires UCD protection
automatically by making a design available in any member state.140 In
contrast, to obtain RCD protection, a designer must register at the
Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and
Designs) (OHIM) in Alicante, Spain.141 By virtue of the UCD, an
original design enjoys protection just because it exists and is
disclosed. Under the previous regime, filing a design/model
application was not an efficient approach, and did not adapt to the
needs of many industrial sectors due to costs, timing, and the
protection’s duration.142 The UCD protection lasts three years “from
the date on which the design was first made available to the public
within the Community.”143 While it is not necessary to file an
application to protect an unregistered design, doing so provides de

18-19
(2011),
available
at
http://dspaceunipr.cilea.it/bitstream/1889/1563/1/tesi%20dottorato%20BRAMBILLA.pdf (It.).
137. Benassi, supra note 128.
138. Entrepreneurs, disappointed and concerned about the inadequacy of national laws to
protect them against the phenomenon of counterfeiting, demanded action from the Community
lawmaker, who replied with the Directive 98/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 13 October 1998 on the Legal Protection of Designs, 1998 O.J. (L289) 28 (EC). This
Directive was followed by Community Design Regulation of 12 December 2001 and the
Commission Regulation (EC) 2245/2002 of 21 October 2002 implementing the Regulation. See
generally BRAMBILLA, supra note 136, at 18-29.
139. See How to Obtain Protection, OFFICE FOR HARMONIZATION IN THE INTERNAL
MARKET
(TRADE
MARKS
&
DESIGNS),
http://oami.europa.eu/ows/rw/pages/RCD/protection/protection.en.do (last updated Apr. 21,
2008).
140. See Unregistered Community Designs, OFFICE FOR HARMONIZATION IN THE
INTERNAL
MARKET
(TRADE
MARKS
&
DESIGNS),
http://oami.europa.eu/ows/rw/pages/RCD/protection/UCD.en.do (last updated Apr. 24, 2008).
141. See generally OFFICE FOR HARMONIZATION IN THE INTERNAL MARKET (TRADE
MARKS & DESIGNS), http://oami.europa.eu/ows/rw/pages/index.en.do (last visited Feb. 25,
2013).
142. The design/model application did not meet the needs of the footwear and clothing
industries which, by their nature, are linked to seasonal fashion cycles. See Benassi, supra note
128.
143. Community Design Regulation, supra note 121, art. 11(1) (titled “Commencement
and Term of Protection of the Unregistered Community Design”).
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facto evidence that the protection actually exists. Furthermore, the
triennial automatic term conceived by the new Regulation
compensates for the lack of protection that some entrepreneurs and
craftsmen experienced prior.
In comparison, an RCD can be protected “for a period of five
years as from the date of the filing of the application. The right holder
may have the term of protection renewed for one or more periods of
five years each, up to a total term of 25 years from the date of
filing.”144 RCD provides designers with an exclusive right that covers
the external appearance of a product or parts thereof.145 The
Regulation defines a “design” as an “appearance of the whole or a
part of a product resulting from the features of, in particular, the lines,
contours, colours, shape, texture and/or materials of the product itself
and/or its ornamentation.”146 In order to receive a protection, a design
shall be “new and has individual character.”147 The protection
includes “any design which does not produce on the informed user a
different overall impression.”148 “[T]he degree of freedom of the
designer in developing his design”149 is the element that will be
considered in assessing the scope of protection.
The new design Regulation also includes some limitations. For
instance, one cannot obtain protection for “features of appearance of a
product which are solely dictated by its technical function”150 and
features of appearance of a product which must necessarily be
reproduced in their exact form and dimensions in order to permit
the product in which the design is incorporated or to which it is
applied to be mechanically connected to or placed in, around or
against another product so that either product may perform its
function.151

Additionally, a design cannot be protected that “is contrary to public
policy or to accepted principles of morality.”152
One commentator makes a sound recommendation that the
United States needs to establish an independent body of law to
144. Id. art. 12 (titled “Commencement and Term of Protection of the Registered
Community Design”).
145. See OFFICE FOR HARMONIZATION IN THE INTERNAL MARKET, supra note 139.
146. Community Design Regulation, supra note 121, art. 3(a).
147. Id. art. 4.
148. Id. art. 10(1).
149. Id. art. 10(2).
150. Id. art. 8(1).
151. Id. art. 8(2).
152. Id. art. 9.
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regulate the protection of fashion designs in order to harmonize
international intellectual property laws and avoid conflict with the
useful arts doctrine.153 In the short term, however, an extension of
existing copyright protection would meet emerging needs.154
B. The Innovative Design Protection Act of 2012: Is it Really
What Designers Need?
The fashion industry is one of the largest and most profitable in
the global economy, comprising almost four percent of global gross
domestic product.155 Recent data on sales of apparel, provided by the
U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, shows a constant annual growth
since 1945.156 In 2008, a considerable portion of Wal-Mart’s annual
revenues came from the sale of clothing.157 Beginning in the 1990s,
the industry witnessed several mergers of fashion houses;158 Louis
Vuitton, for example, was able to buy several prestigious brands and
has become even stronger in the market.159 Thanks to this exponential
and continuous growth, fashion house owners are some of the richest
people in the world,160 and the fashion industry has been able to
strongly shape popular culture.161
153. Silvia Beltrametti, Evaluation of the Design Piracy Prohibition Act: Is the Cure
Worse Than the Disease? An Analogy with Counterfeiting and a Comparison with the
Protection Available in the European Community, 8 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 147, 168
(2010).
154. Id.
155. Jimenez, supra note 123, at 6.
156. See Innovative Design Protection and Piracy Prevention Act: Hearing on H.R. 2511
Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual Property, Competition, and the Internet of the H. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 75 (2011) [hereinafter IDPPPA Hearing], available at
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/printers/112th/112-46_67397.PDF (statement of Christopher
Sprigman, Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law).
157. See Jimenez, supra note 123, at 6.
158. Id. at 7.
159. See id.; Suzy Wetlaufer, The Perfect Paradox of Star Brands: An Interview with
Bernard Arnault of LVMH, HARV. BUS. REV., Oct. 2001, at 117, 118.
160. According to The Forbes World’s Billionaires List of 2012, three owners of
renowned fashion brands appear in the top ten list: Bernard Arnault (Louis Vuitton Moët
Hennessy (LVMH)) in fourth position ($41 billion net worth), Amancio Ortega (ZARA España,
S.A.) in fifth position ($37.5 billion net worth), and Stefan Persson (H & M Hennes & Mauritz
AB) in eighth position ($26 billion net worth). See The World’s Billionaires 2012, YAHOO!
FINANCE (Mar. 7, 2012, 12:18 PM), http://finance.yahoo.com/news/the-world%E2%80%99sbillionaires-2012.html?page=all. The most recent Forbes’s calculations in March 2013 place
Amancio Ortega in third position with $57 billion, Bernard Arnault in tenth position with $29
billion, and Stefan Persson in twelfth position with $28 billion. See The World’s Billionaires,
FORBES, http://www.forbes.com/billionaires/list/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2013).
161. See, e.g., MARK TUNGATE, FASHION BRANDS: BRANDING STYLE FROM ARMANI TO
ZARA (2d ed. 2008) (“Fashion is too prevalent to be considered trivial. Even when you say
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Unlike authors and musicians, fashion designers cannot obtain
copyright protection for their creative output; they can only protect
their logos, by trademark. In fashion, only jewelry can receive
copyright protection because they are considered miniature
sculptures. Clothing is considered a “useful article”—and thus not
eligible for copyright protection—because copyright law holds that it
is not possible to separate the unique design traits of clothing from its
functionality.162
This lack of protection has resulted in the birth of some brands
that produce “knock-offs” of luxury brands sold at a lower price, and
these companies are not subjected to any legal consequence for doing
so. Is counterfeiting not the same as knocking-off? Is a knock-off
always legal? Knocking-off in many countries—including the United
States—may be either legal or illegal depending on what part of
garment and how much is “borrowed.”163 Counterfeiting is an
“aggravated” form of infringement where a party deliberately and
knowingly misappropriates intellectual property of another by making
a copy of an original good (usually protected by a trademark, but may
also include copyrighted products) with the intent to mislead the
consumer as to the product’s origin.164 The Copyright Act attaches a
criminal liability to this kind of willful infringement,165 but because
fashion designs cannot be copyrighted, they can be freely copied,
without being subjected to any legal consequence for doing so. These
counterfeit products often become available within weeks after the
original comes to market. Sometimes, they are sold even before the

you’re not interested in fashion, you’ve been forced to confront it. Fashion is everywhere. What
you choose to wear or not to wear has become a political statement. You don’t buy clothes—you
buy an identity.” (quoting fashion photographer Vincent Peters)).
162. But see Boyds Collection, Ltd. v. Bearington Collection, Inc., 360 F. Supp. 2d 655,
661 (M.D. Pa. 2005). Boyds held that clothing for a toy Teddy Bear was not a useful article,
because “[c]lothing on a bear replicates the form but not the function of clothing on a person”.
Id. The court reached this conclusion after explaining the difference between clothing for a
human being—that “may be worn by an individual to cover and protect his or her body”—and
clothing for toys. Id. The court stated:
The clothing on a teddy bear obviously has no utilitarian function. It is not
intended to cover embarrassing anatomical aspects or to protect the bear from
exterior elements. Rather, it is intended and serves only to modify the appearance
of the bear, to give the doll a different “look and feel” from others.
Id.
163. Jimenez, supra note 123, at 16-17. See generally TIM PHILLIPS, KNOCKOFF: THE
DEADLY TRADE IN COUNTERFEIT GOODS (2007).
164. See id at 17.
165. 17 U.S.C. § 506 (2011).

MANCINELLA

2013]

4/18/2013 1:29 AM

A “LIGHT” FOR DESIGNERS’ RIGHTS

551

original.166
Both counterfeiting and knock-offs represent the real plague of
the fashion industry. Even though it is arduous to determinate the
precise size of the counterfeit market and, consequently, the effects of
counterfeiting, industry experts are aware of the seriousness of this
problem.167 The available data, which can shed light on the
significance of this phenomenon, come from police raids and customs
authorities’ discoveries.168 There is not even an agreement on factors

166. See MOISÉS NAÍM, ILLICIT: HOW SMUGGLERS, TRAFFICKERS, AND COPYCATS ARE
HIJACKING THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (Anchor Books 2006) (2005). In the first chapter, titled
“The Wars We Are Losing,” the author relates some interesting but worrisome information:
The Chinese version of Bill Clinton’s autobiography My Life that hit the
streets in July 2004, months before the official, licensed translation, was
obviously a grotesque forgery. Its appearance served as a welcome of sorts,
introducing the former president to one of the more dubious honors of modern
writerly fame. In Colombia, for instance, an entire cottage industry specializes in
unlicensed copies of the works of the country’s great novelist Gabriel García
Márquez. In 2004 a master copy of the Nobel Prize winner’s first novel in ten
years vanished without a trace from the printing press. Days later, a pirate edition
could be found on Bogotá sidewalks, its text accurate but for the final revisions
that García Márquez, a perfectionist, had been waiting until the last moment to
turn in.
Id. at 1.
167.
See, e.g., MICHEL CHEVALIER & PIERRE LU, LUXURY CHINA: MARKET
OPPORTUNITIES AND POTENTIAL 175-94 (2010).
Everything today, from cognac to mineral water, can be, and very often is,
counterfeited. Luxury is one of the most popular sectors for counterfeiters,
because it is cheap to copy and easy to sell. In 2000, the Global AntiCounterfeiting Group reported that 11% of the world’s clothing and footwear was
fake, and the World Customs Organization believes that the fashion industry
loses up to US$9.2 billion per year to counterfeiting. In 2004, the European
Commission reported that trade in counterfeit clothing, footwear, perfume and
toiletries reduced the European Union’s gross domestic product by more than
US$6 billion each year and cost 10,800 jobs, with the figures increasing every
year.
Id. at 175.
168. See, e.g., Raymond W. Kelly, Commissioner of the New York City Police
Department, Keynote Address at the 5th Annual Harper’s Bazaar Anti-Counterfeiting Summit
Mar. 16, 2009).
In the last two years, the Police Department has seized $25 million worth of
goods and $2 million from personal and professional bank accounts. We’ve had
100 establishments deemed to be criminal nuisances and 67 were shut down. Last
year alone we made more than 2,000 arrests for trademark counterfeiting. But
until we change the central dynamic of the industry, namely rich rewards and
absurdly low risk, we’ll be hard pressed to do more than manage a tidal wave of
counterfeits flooding the market here in New York. This is a sobering fact.
Id. In 2012 the U.S. Customs and Border Protection seized $511million worth of counterfeit
fashion goods, most of them from China. See Dhani Mau, $511 Million Worth of Counterfeit
Handbags and Wallets Was Seized in 2012, FASHIONISTA (Mar. 7, 2013),
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necessary to calculate the scale of counterfeiting.169 It is clear that
fashion designers need legal protection. Creating such protection is
the subject of ongoing debates.170 The Fashion Design Bill171 seems
incapable of garnering broad agreement.172
If the bill is enacted, what some companies are doing—living
parasitically off the creativity of other designers—would be illegal.
This will probably open a Pandora box of costly lawsuits, but at the
same time it will guarantee much needed protection, especially for
independent and small emerging designers.173
The Fashion Design Bill, like the Vessel Hull Design Protection
Act, creates protection for articles (the first one for clothing, while the
second one for boat hull) that otherwise cannot receive copyright
protection. The Fashion Design Bill creates three new legal
standards174: first, if designs are demonstrably “unique,
distinguishable, non-trivial and non-utilitarian variation over prior
designs”175 they will be sufficiently original to receive protection;
second, the term “substantially identical” will be the infringement
standard;176 and third, it creates a heightened pleading standard, such
that the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the design is
protectable, that the infringing product is substantially identical, and
that “the defendant saw or otherwise had knowledge of the protected
http://fashionista.com/2013/03/511-million-worth-of-counterfeit-handbags-and-wallets-wasseized-in-2012/.
169. CHAUDHRY & ZIMMERMAN, supra note 125, at 9-11.
170. See Layne Randolph, IDPA: U.S. Debates the Pros and Cons of Copyright Protection
for Fashion Design, LAYNE RANDOLPH (Jan. 23, 2012), http://laynerandolph.com/?p=93
(providing an analysis of the two different positions between those who feel the necessity to
guarantee copyright protection to fashion designers and those who do not).
171. See IDPPPA, supra note 1. See generally Beltrametti, supra note 153; Laura Fanelli,
Note, A Fashion Forward Approach to Design Protection, 85 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 285 (2011).
172. See IDPPPA Hearing, supra note 156, at 77-90 (comments of Kal Raustiala,
Professor of Law, University of California at Los Angeles School of Law, and Christopher
Sprigman, Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law).
The IDPPPA is likely to do little to benefit designers, but will prove a boon for
lawyers. It will give rise to many questionable lawsuits against designers,
manufacturers, distributors, and retailers. This will act as a tax on business and an
impediment to entrepreneurs. And as a result, the IDPPPA is likely to raise the
price that consumers pay for clothes.
Id. at 77-78.
173. See Christina Binkley, The Problem with Being a Trendsetter, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 29,
2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704423504575212201552288996.html.
174. Sheba Sheikh, Fashion Law and the IDPPPA, THE FASHION GRID (Mar. 23, 2012),
http://www.thefashiongrid.com/home/2012/3/23/fashion-law-and-the-idpppa.html.
175. IDPPPA, supra note 1, § 2(a)(2)(B).
176. Id. § 2(e).
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design.”177
The new law would provide the fashion designer with protection
for three years.178 This time period, considered suitable for the
cyclical nature of fashion, will permit designers not only to introduce
their original clothing without being imitated with impunity by fastfashion retailers,179 but also allows the garments to enter the public
domain within a reasonable time. Only if the article of clothing is
considered substantially identical designers are entitled to claim
infringement.180
In conclusion, it is important to note that although designers can
obtain trademark and trade dress protection, these intellectual
property rights are likely not accessible for young designers. It takes
time and money to show secondary meaning, which is fundamental
for trademark protection.181 In addition, the lack of time and money
make young designers an easy prey for design pirates, who reduce the
profits of these young designers by impacting sales of the designers’
garments.182 Fashion luxury brands such as Prada, Loro Piana,
Armani, or Valentino may see their profits decrease due to
counterfeiting or knock-offs, but they can rely on the success of their
brands, which are well-known thanks to shrewd, wise and expensive
investments in advertising, research and development and above all,
in high quality’s products. All of these efforts take time, which many
young designers need, especially in an industry where they are at the
base of a pyramid whose top is filled with famous designers that
“paint” the seasonal trends. The lack of protection provided by
intellectual property rights makes their efforts even more difficult.183
Although copying of a design might be seen as “endemic and

177. Id. § 2(g).
178. Id. § 2(d).
179. See Sheikh, supra note 174.
180. This is a stark contrast from the current legislation where the defendant does not need
to produce an identical copy. Id. Infringement exists only when the work is substantially similar.
Id. An exception to this rule is provided for sound recordings. 17 U.S.C. § 114(b) (2011) (“The
exclusive right of the owner of copyright in a sound recording under clause (1) of section 106 is
limited to the right to duplicate the sound recording in the form of phonorecords or copies that
directly or indirectly recapture the actual sounds fixed in the recording.”); see also MCJOHN,
supra note 27, at 148.
181. Loni Schutte, Note, Copyright for Couture, 2011 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. no. 11, at 12 (2011), available at http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1225&contex
t=dltr.
182. Id. at 2-3.
183. Id. at 3.
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condoned”184 this stealing of identity in the fashion industry cannot be
accepted as a justification. A garment should be more than just a
piece of fabric behind a window, which anyone can copy. It
represents a way of communicating and expressing the designer’s
soul through design. That is why it has to be original.
Therefore, why should there be greater copyright protection in
fashion law? In other words, is the Fashion Design Bill necessary?
One answer is, “because it’s really tough for designers out there
whose labels and logos don’t mean anything to the public yet—the
emerging designers who have to sell their designs and can’t just sell
their names—get copied all the time, and therefore need some kind of
protection.”185
C. What Opponents Think about the Fashion Design Bill? A
Comparison with the E.U. Design Regulation
Opponents of intellectual property protection for fashion
designers, in criticizing the European Design Law, argue that just a
few designers have registered their designs and that there had not
been an increase in lawsuits.186 Although these critics recognize that
the E.U. law has had little effect, they believe that a similar law in the
United States could have a harmful and detrimental impact.187 The
European Commission, in order to incentivize the use of the E.U. law
and defeat this paradox,188 decided to take measures by preparing the
Sectorial Intellectual Property Rights Guide189 for small and medium
enterprises (SMEs).
European research on why SMEs have been reluctant to use the
new design protection Regulation shows lack of knowledge, money,
inadequate investments in innovation, and difficult procedural
requirements.190 This research shows that the primary reasons why

184. Brian Hilton, Chong Ju Choi & Stephen Chen, The Ethics of Counterfeiting in the
Fashion Industry: Quality, Credence and Profit Issues, 55 J. BUS. ETHICS 345, 353 (2004).
185. Bloomberg Law, Scafidi Says Fashion Copyright to Increase Consumer Options,
YOUTUBE, at 2:00-2:18 (Sept. 26, 2011), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=395ADDsICwU
(interview with Susan Scafidi, Professor of Law and Director of Fashion Law Institute, Fordham
University School of Law).
186. See IDPPPA Hearing, supra note 156, at 85.
187. Id.
188. Roya Ghafele, Resolving the Paradox of Innovation in Europe’s Fashion Industry—
The Need of a Practical Guide, 42 IPR HELPDESK BULLETIN, Apr.-June 2009, at 2.
189. Id.; Fanelli, supra note 171, at 311; Agnieszka Turynska, How to Make Ends Meet—
Sectoral IPR Guides for SMEs, 41 IPR HELPDESK BULLETIN, Jan.-Mar. 2009, at 3.
190. Turynska, supra note 189.
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SMEs do not use the new laws are lack of funds and information,
rather than any perceived weakness or discrepancy in this
legislation.191 The European Commission has responded with four
guidelines192—one for each sector: textiles and clothing, leather,
footwear, and furniture—that demonstrate its belief in the efficacy of
this law.193
Opponents of the E.U. law criticize it for not having been able to
eradicate design piracy.194 Nobody expected immediate results, but
the law has proven to be a necessary step in combating a growing
problem that targets both creativity and originality, and thus strikes
the fashion industry at its core.195
In their attempt to argue that the Fashion Design Bill is
unnecessary, detractors assert that copying helps the industry.196 They
argue that simply because a fashion copy looks like an original, does
not mean it competes for the same customers.197 A consumer who
purchases a fake Louis Vuitton wallet, for example, may not be able
to afford the $500 genuine article.198 Therefore, the argument goes,
the two items are not in the same market segment.199 This reasoning is
certainly questionable. Who can guarantee that a person who can
191.
192.

Id.
IPEUROPAWARE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, A BUSINESS TOOL FOR SMES: A GUIDE
FOR
THE
FOOTWEAR
INDUSTRY
(2009),
available
at
http://www.innovaccess.eu/files/handbooks/footwear-ingles.pdf;
IPEUROPAWARE,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, A BUSINESS TOOL FOR SMES: A GUIDE FOR THE FURNITURE
INDUSTRY (2009), available at http://www.innovaccess.eu/files/handbooks/footwear-ingles.pdf;
IPEUROPAWARE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, A BUSINESS TOOL FOR SMES: A GUIDE FOR THE
LEATHER INDUSTRY (2009), available at http://www.innovaccess.eu/files/handbooks/leatheringles.pdf; IPEUROPAWARE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, A BUSINESS TOOL FOR SMES: A GUIDE
TEXTILE
INDUSTRY
(2009),
available
at
FOR
THE
http://www.innovaccess.eu/files/handbooks/textile-ingles.pdf. The guides explain the important
role that intellectual property rights should have for SMEs, analyze the way to use them in a
proper way, give advice on intellectual property strategies, and explain how SMEs can create
value and make money by using intellectual property rights.
193. See Fanelli, supra note 171, at 312 n.189.
194. See, e.g., IDPPPA Hearing, supra note 156, at 85.
195. Steven Kolb, Chief Executive Officer of the Council of Fashion Designers of
America (CFDA), said after the verdict came down in the Tory Burch case: “Counterfeiting not
only robs the designer of what is rightfully theirs, but also negatively impacts the American
economy and the jobs associated with designers’ investments.” Kelly O’Reilly, Tory Burch
Awarded $164 Million in Anti-Counterfeiting Suit, NBC N.Y. (June 10, 2011, 2:09 PM),
http://www.nbcnewyork.com/blogs/threadny/THREAD-Tory-Burch-Awarded-164-Million-inAnti-Counterfeiting-Suit-123639144.html.
196. See IDPPPA Hearing, supra note 156, at 75.
197. Id. at 84.
198. Id.
199. Id.
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afford the original would not instead buy a copy? Wealth is not
always the determining factor. Some models are so well imitated that
it is difficult to recognize the original from the fake, and thus a person
who can afford an original may be just as content with the knock-off.
So, the two products can, in fact, compete with each other in the same
market. And above all, as long as the fake exists, each consumer will
have the opportunity to choose.200 Choosing the imitation promotes
the “business” of knocking-off rather than counteracts it.
IV. CONCLUSION
The E.U. law should be regarded as an example that can serve to
facilitate the implementation and enforcement of pending U.S. design
legislation. It is unlikely that the Fashion Design Bill, if enacted, will
become the panacea for all knocking-off. It would, however, represent
a step forward in protecting the intellectual property rights for the
fashion industry. At the very least, it would create a new incentive to
discourage knocking-off, which operates exactly like plagiarism for
literary copying: as a theft of creativity.201 Only time will tell whether
or not this law is capable of abolishing—or only mitigating—
protracted copyright abuses.
The U.S. Constitution seeks to “promote the Progress of Science
and the useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors . . . the
exclusive right to their Respective Writings.”202 Justice Stewart, in
interpreting this clause, said:

200. New York City Councilmember Margaret Chin is collecting signatures for a petition
in support of proposed legislation to make purchasing fake goods a crime (currently only selling
a fake is illegal). The bill, if enacted, will be a significant public deterrent and should make it
easier for the police to combat counterfeiting. See Make It Illegal to Buy Counterfeit: Pass
Trademark Counterfeit Legislation, SIGNON.ORG, http://signon.org/sign/make-it-illegal-to-buy
(last visited Mar. 25, 2013).
201. Marcus Valerius Martialis (c.A.D. 40-c.A.D. 104) was the first Latin classical poet to
use the term plagiarius to refer to literary theft. BILL MARSH, PLAGIARISM: ALCHEMY AND
REMEDY IN HIGHER EDUCATION 31 (2007); Katharina de la Durantaye, The Origins of the
Protection of Literary Authorship in Ancient Rome, 25 B.U. INT’L L.J. 37, 71-72 (2007). In his
epigrams, he used to accuse other poets of copying his works: “[C]um se dominum vocabit ille, /
[D]icas esse meos manuque missos / [H]oc si terque quaterque clamitaris / [I]npones plagiario
pudorem.” (“[W]hen that fellow calls himself their owner, say that they are mine, set forth from
my hand. If thrice and four times you shout this, you will shame the plagiarist.”); “[U]na est in
nostris tua, Fidentine, libellis / [P]agina, sed certa domini signata figura, / [Q]uae tua traducit
manifesto carmina furto.” (“There is one page of yours, Fidentinus, in a book of mine—a page,
too, stamped by the distinct likeness of its master—which convicts your poem of palpable
theft.”). 1 MARTIAL, EPIGRAMS 62-63 (T. E. Page, E. Capps & W. H. D. Rouse eds., C. A. Ker
trans., 1919).
202. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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The immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return
for an “author’s” creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this
incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public
good. “The sole interest of the United States and the primary object
in conferring the monopoly,” this Court has said, “lie in the general
benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors.”203

Yet one significant and immensely creative group is excluded:
fashion designers. Copying fashion designs represents a degradation
of creativity, intuition, inspiration, and, consequently, the death of an
ingenuity that only human beings are able to release and give form to.
Loss of the creativity of designers is, in turn, a loss to society.204 In
this sense, we should carefully reflect on the scope and origin of these
copyrights, and remember why they have been guaranteed.

203. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (quoting Fox
Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932)).
204. The Statute of Anne, an act of the British Parliament, was the first one to provide for
copyright regulated by the government and courts. See Act for the Encouragement of Learning
(Statute of Anne), 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Gr. Brit.). This statute, also known as the Copyright Act
of 1709, was created “for the Encouragement of Learned Men to Compose and Write useful
Books.” Id. ch. 1. See generally GLOBAL COPYRIGHT: THREE HUNDRED YEARS SINCE THE
STATUTE OF ANNE, FROM 1709 TO CYBERSPACE 7-168 (Lionel Bently, Uma Suthersanen & Paul
Torremans eds., 2010); see also Jack Lynch, The Perfectly Acceptable Practice of Literary
Theft: Plagiarism, Copyright, and the Eighteenth Century, 24 COLONIAL WILLIAMSBURG no. 4,
Winter 2002-03, at 51, available at http://www.writing-world.com/rights/lynch.shtml.

